Consider a wireless broadcast device-to-device (D2D) network wherein users' devices are interested in receiving some popular files. Each user's device possesses part of the content which is acquired in previous transmissions and cooperates with others to recover the missing packets by exchanging Instantly Decodable Network Coding (IDNC) packets. Recently, a distributed solution, relying on a noncooperative game-theoretic formulation, has been proposed to reduce the communication time for fully connected D2D networks, i.e., single-hop D2D networks. In this paper, we develop a distributed gametheoretical solution to reduce the communication time for a more realistic scenario of a decentralized and partially connected, i.e., multi-hop, IDNC-enabled D2D network. The problem is modeled as a coalition game with cooperative-players wherein the payoff function is derived so that decreasing individual payoff results in the desired cooperative behavior. Given the intractability of the formulation, the coalition game is relaxed to a coalition formation game (CFG) involving the formation of disjoint coalitions.
D2D-enabled systems [19] [20] [21] [22] . The potential of IDNC technique is manifold [23] .
All the aforementioned IDNC works, for both PMP and D2D networks, are centralized in a sense that they require a global coordinator, i.e., a BS or a cloud, to plan packet combinations and coordinate transmissions. For example, the authors of [22] considered the completion time minimization problem in a partially connected D2D FRANs. The problem is solved under the assumption that the fog is within the transmission range of all devices and has perfect knowledge of the network topology. The authors suggested that the fog selects transmitting devices and their optimal packet combinations and conveys the information to the users for execution.
While the aforementioned centralized approaches provide a good performance for the decentralized system, it comes at a high computation cost at the cloud/fog units and high power consumption at each user. Indeed, users need to send the status of all D2D channels to the central controller at each time slot. In addition, the cloud controller requires to know the downloading history of users for content delivery. Recently, the authors in [24] , [25] proposed a distributed solution for D2D networks that rely on a non-cooperative game-theoretic formulation. However, in such game models, each player makes its decisions individually and selfishly. Furthermore, the system is assumed to be fully connected, i.e., single-hop, which only selects one player to transmit at any time instance. The fully connected model is not only an idealist in which all players are connected, it also causes severe latency (delay) in the network. Our work proposes a fully distributed solution for completion time minimization in a partially connected D2D network using coalition games [26] . Thus, multiple and altruistic players transmit IDNC packets simultaneously.
Due to the cooperative and altruistic decisions among players, coalition games have been used in different network settings to optimize different parameters [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . For example, the tutorial in [27] classified the coalition games and demonstrated the applications of coalition games in communication networks. The authors of [28] proposed a distributed game theoretical scheme for users' cooperation in wireless networks to maximize users' rate while accounting the cost of cooperation. The authors of [30] proposed a Bayesian coalitional game for coalitionbased cooperative packet delivery. Recently, the authors of [31] suggested a constrained coalition formation game for minimizing users' content uploading in D2D multi-hop networks. For packet recovery purpose, we employ coalition game and IDNC optimization in D2D multi-hop networks.
Our work considers D2D multi-hop networks comprising several single-interface devices distributed in a geographical area, and each device is partially connected to other devices. The packet recovery problem is motivated by real-time applications that tolerate only low delays, i.e., multimedia streaming. In such applications, users' devices need to immediately exchange a set of packets, represented by a frame, between them with the minimum communication time. Our proposed model appears in different applications. For example, in current LTE system, where users at the edge of the service area or in dense urban areas often experience high degradation in the quality of signal from data centers due to channel impairments. Our proposed D2D distributed scheme would improve the total communication time of such users by implementing short and reliable D2D communications. Moreover, in cell centers with low erasures, our proposed scheme would offload the cloud's resources, e.g., time, bandwidth, and the ability to serve more users.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, our work solves the completion time reduction problem in partially connected D2D networks. To this end, we introduce a novel coalition game framework capturing the complex interplays of instantly decodable network coding, transmitting user-receiving user associations, and a limited coverage zone of each user. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We formulate the completion time minimization problem in partially connected D2D networks and model it as a coalition game. We further demonstrate the difficulty of expressing the problem as a coalition game with non-transfer function (NTU) which motivates its relaxation to a coalition formation game (CFG).
2) We derive the rules for assigning players 1 , selecting transmitting player, and finding optimal encoded IDNC packets for each disjoint altruistic coalition.
3) We propose a distributed algorithm based on merge-and-split rules and study its convergence analysis, stability, complexity, and communication overhead.
4)
We validate our theoretical finding using numerical simulations. Our numerical results reveal that our distributed scheme can significantly outperform existing centralized PMP and fully distributed methods. Indeed, for presented network setups, our coalition formation game offers almost the same performance as the centralized FRAN scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and formulates the completion time minimization problem. Afterward, the problem is modeled as a coalition game and relaxed to a coalition formation game in Section III. The proposed distributed algorithm can be found in Section IV, and its convergence analysis, stability, complexity, and 1 Player and device are used interchangeably throughout this paper. communication overhead are provided in Section V. Section VI numerically tests the performance of the proposed method against existing schemes, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The considered network and IDNC models are introduced in Section II-A and Section II-B, respectively. The fully distributed completion time reduction problem in the considered network is formulated in Section II-C. Section II-D further shows through a simple example that the completion time problem is generally intractable, which motivates the coalition game formulation in Section III.
A. Network Model and Parameters
Consider a D2D-enabled wireless network consisting of N users denoted by the set U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u N }. These users are interested in receiving a frame P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p M } of M packets. The size of the frame P depends on the size of the packet and size of content. Due to previous initial transmissions, from data centers or access points, each device holds a part of the frame P. The side information of the u-th device is represented by the following sets.
• The Has set H u : Successfully received packets.
• The Wants set W u = P \ H u : Erased/lost packets.
The side information of all players can be summarized in a binary N × M state matrix S = [s up ] wherein the entry s up = 0 states that packet p is successfully received by player u and 1 otherwise. In order for all users to obtain the whole frame P from D2D communications, we assume that each packet p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ M is received by at least one user. In other words, the sum of the rows u∈U s up ≥ 1 for all packets p ∈ P.
We consider a realistic multi-hop network topology. In such networks, battery-powered devices can only target the subset of devices in their coverage zone, denoted here by C u of the u-th player. The network topology can be captured by a unit diagonal symmetric N × N adjacency matrix C represents the connectivity of the players such that C uu = 1 if and only if u ∈ C u .
We assume that no part of the network is disjoint, i.e., the matrix C is connected. Otherwise, the proposed algorithm is separately applied to each independent part of the network. Upon successful reception of a packet, each player send an error-free acknowledgment (ACK) to all players in its coverage zone to update their side information matrix.
We focus only on upper layer view of the network, where network coding scheme is performed at the network-layer and the physical-layer is abstracted by a memory-less erasure channel. This abstraction is widely used in network coding literature, where a packet is either perfectly received or completely lost with certain average probability [8] , [10] , [19] , [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , [32] . Therefore, the physical channel between players u and u is modeled by a Bernoulli random variable whose mean σ uu indicates the packet erasure probability from player u to player u . We assume that these probabilities remain constant during the transmission of a single packet p i ∈ P and they are known to all devices. However, due to the channel's asymmetry and the difference in the transmit powers of both devices u and u , the equality of σ uu and σ u u is not guaranteed.
We consider a slowly changing network topology, in which players have fixed locations during the IDNC packet transmission and change from one transmission to another transmission.
However, after one transmission, the devices can move and all the network variables will be updated, and our model, i.e., the coalition formation solution, can be used with updated network parameters. It is important to note that in single-hop networks, each player is connected to all other players in the network, and hence, it precisely knows the side information of all other players. To avoid any collision in the network, only one player is allowed to transmit an encoded packet in one hop at any time slot. Clearly, this causes severe latency, i.e., delay, in delivering packets to all players. In multi-hop networks, multiple players are allowed to transmit encoded packets simultaneously. This results in targeting many players, and thus makes the delivery of packets to the players faster.
B. Instantly Decodable Network Coding Model
IDNC encodes packets through binary XOR operations. Let κ ⊂ P be an XOR combination of some packets in P. The transmission of the combination κ is beneficial to the u-th user, in a sense that it allows the u-th user to retrieve one of its missing packets, if and only if the combination contains a single packet from W u . In that case, the user u can XOR the combination κ with κ ∩ H u to obtain its missing packet. Hence, we say that the user u is targeted by the transmission κ.
Let A (t) ⊂ U denote the set of transmitting players at the t-th transmission and κ (t) (A) = (κ 1 , · · · , κ |A (t) | ) denote the packet combinations to be sent by users in A (t) . For notation simplicity, the time index t is often omitted when it is clear from the context. Similar to [21] , [22] , [24] , [25] , we consider players use the same frequency band and transmit encoded packets simultaneously. Thus, players located in the intersection of the coverage zone of multiple transmitting players experience collision at the network layer and no packets can be decoded.
Considering the interference of transmissions caused by other players to the set of transmitting players in partially connected D2D networks can be pursued in a future work. Therefore, player u is targeted by the transmission from the u-th player if and only if it can receive the transmission and the packet combination contains a single file from W u . Let τ (κ(A)) = (τ 1 , · · · , τ |A| ) denote the set of targeted players by the transmitting players wherein u ∈ τ u (κ(A)) implies that We use IDNC to minimize the completion time required to complete the reception of all packets for all users in the partially connected D2D network. Given that the direct minimization of the completion time is intractable [23] , we follow [12] in reducing the completion time by controlling the decoding delay. 
C. Completion Time Minimization Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we formulate the distributed completion time reduction problem in IDNCenabled D2D network. Let N be a binary vector of size N whose u-th index is 1 if player u has non-empty Wants set, i.e., W u = ∅ and 0 otherwise, and let τ (κ(A)) = 1 − τ (κ(A)) be the set of the non-targeted players by the encoded packets κ(A). The different erasure occurrences at the t-th time slot are denoted by ω :
where Y uu is a Bernoulli random variable equal to 0 with probability σ uu .
Let a t = (a [1] t , a [2] t , · · · , a [N ] t ) be a binary vector of length N whose a [u] t -th element is equal to 1 if player u is transmitting, i.e., a 1 = |A|. Likewise, let D(a t ) be the decoding delay experienced by all players in the t-th recovery round. In particular, D(a t ) is a metric quantifies the ability of the transmitting players to generate innovative packets for all the targeted players.
This metric increases by one unit for each player that still wants packets and successfully receives a nonuseful transmission from any transmitting player in A or for a transmitting player that still wants some packets. Let I = (I [1] , I [2] , · · · , I [N ] ) be a binary vector of size N whose I [u] entry is 1 if player u is hearing more than one transmission from the set A, i.e., u ∈ C u ∩ C u where u = u ∈ A and 0 otherwise, and let O = (O [1] , O [2] , · · · , O [N ] ) be a binary vector of size N whose O [u] element is 1 if player u is out of transmission range of any player in A, i.e., u / ∈ C u , ∀ u ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
Given the above configurations, the overall decoding delays D(a t ) experienced by all players, since the beginning of the recovery phase until the t-th transmission, can be expressed as follows.
As mentioned, the completion time is a difficult and intractable metric to optimize. However, in network coding literature, such metric is approximated by the anticipated completion time which can be computed at each time instant using the decoding delay. Using the decoding delay in (1), the anticipated completion time is defined as follows. 
where |W (0) u | is the Wants set of player u at the beginning of the recovery phase and E[σ u ] is the expected erasure probability linking player u to the other players.
Clearly, (2) represents the number of transmissions that are required to complete the transmission of all requested packets in P. In this context, completion time is intimately related to the throughput of the system. Throughput is measured as the number of cooperative D2D transmission rounds required by the players to download all their requested packets.
The overall anticipated completion time can be written as T (a t ) = max u (T u (a t )) = T (a t ) ∞ . Therefore, the anticipated completion time minimization problem at the t-th transmission in IDNC-enabled D2D multi-hop network can be written as follows.
Unlike single-hop model that requires only an optimization over a single transmitting player and its corresponding packet combination, a multi-hop model needs to select the set of transmitting players A and the optimal encoded packets κ(A). As such, the probability of increasing the anticipated completion time is minimized.
D. Example of IDNC Transmissions in a Partially Connected D2D-enabled Network
This section illustrates the aforementioned definitions and concepts with a simple example.
Consider a simple partially connected D2D network containing 6 players and a frame P = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 } as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The side information of all players is given on the left part of Fig. 1 , and the coverage zone of each player is represented by edges. For ease of analysis, we assume error-free transmissions.
Assume that u 1 transmits the encoded packet κ 1 = p 3 ⊕ p 4 to players u 2 , u 3 , u 5 , and let u 6 transmit κ 6 = p 1 ⊕ p 4 to players u 4 , u 5 in the first time slot. Then, in the second time slot, u 4 transmits κ 4 = p 2 to u 6 , and u 1 transmits κ 1 = p 2 ⊕ p 4 to players u 2 , u 5 . The decoding delay experienced by the different players is given as follows.
• Player u 5 experiences one unit delay as it is in the intersection of the coverage zone of u 1 and u 6 . In other words, u 5 is in collision, i.e., u 5 ∈ I. Thus, player u 5 would not be able to decode packet κ 6 transmitted by player u 6 .
• Player u 6 experiences one unit of delay as it is transmitting in the first time slot.
Under this scenario, we have the following assumption.
• First time slot: N = (0 1 1 1 1 1), the set of transmitting players A (1) = {u 1 , u 6 } = a 1 = (1 0 0 0 0 1), the corresponding encoded packets κ(A (1) ) = (κ 1 , κ 6 ), and the set of
The set of players that hearing more than one transmission I = (0 0 0 0 1 0), and the set of players that out of transmission range of any player in A (1) is O = 0. The decoding delay experienced by all players is D(a 1 ) = (0 0 0 0 1 1). The accumulative decoding delay is D(a 1 ) = (0 0 0 0 1 1). 
III. DISTRIBUTED COMPLETION TIME MINIMIZATION AS A COALITION GAME
This section models the completion time problem in IDNC-enabled D2D multi-hop networks using coalition games [26] . Afterward, fundamental concepts in coalition games are defined and provided. These concepts are used in Section IV to derive the distributed completion time reduction solution in a partially connected D2D network.
A. Completion Time Minimization as a Coalition Game
To mathematically model the aforementioned completion time problem, we use coalition game theory. In particular, the problem is modeled as a coalition game with a non-transferable utility (NTU) [26] . U is the set of players consisting of N devices and φ is a real function such that for every coalition S s ⊆ U, φ(S s ) is the payoff that coalition S s receives which cannot be arbitrarily apportioned between its players.
For the problem of cooperative D2D completion time among players, given any coalition
represents the payoff of player u in coalition S s . Lets |S s | represents the total number of players in S s . The |S|-dimensional vector represents the family of real vector payoffs of coalition S s , which is denoted by φ(S s ). As previously mentioned, for each coalition, we need to determine the transmitting player and its IDNC packet selection in order to minimize the increasing of the completion time. Consequently, by adopting the cooperative D2D completion model described in the previous section, the total payoff of any coalition S s ⊆ U, ∀s = {1, · · · , k} is given by
where φ u (S) is the payoff of player u which is in our problem given by
The payoff function in (4) represents the total payoff that a coalition receives due to selforganize players. For a player u ∈ S s , the first term in (5) represents the maximum anticipated completion time among players in S s that is defined in (2) . Similarly, the second term in (5) represents the augmentation of the sum decoding delay that is defined in (1) . Therefore, players in coalitions prefer to increase the payoff in (5) by minimizing the anticipated completion time through controlling the decoding delay.
Property 1. The proposed D2D completion time cooperative problem is modeled as a coalition game with NTU (U, φ) where U is the set of players and φ is the payoff function given by (4) .
Proof: From the nature of definition 1 and definition 2, each player u has its own unique anticipated completion time and decoding delay, and, thus, it has a unique payoff φ u (S s ) within a coalition S s . Therefore, the payoff function in (4) cannot be arbitrarily apportioned between coalition's players. Thus (4) is considered as an NTU. Further, the overall completion time is the maximum individual completion times of the players regardless of the coalition. In other words, the dependency of φ(S s ) in any coalition structure is not only on packet recovery of players inside S s , but also on packet recovery outside S s , which concludes that the proposed game model is NTU game.
Although cooperation generally reduces the payoffs of players [26] , it is limited by inherent information exchange cost that needs to be paid by the players when acting cooperatively.
Consequently, for any coalition S s ⊆ U, players need to exchange information for cooperation, which is an increasing function of the coalition size. The problem becomes severe when all players are in the same coalition, i.e., grand coalition (GC). However, given the realistic scenario of a partially connected network where each device has limited coverage, it is highly likely that when attempting to form the GC, one of these scenarios would hold: 1) there exist a pair of players u, u ∈ U that are distant enough to receive packets from the set A, thus they have no incentive to join the grand coalition, and 2) there exists a player u ∈ U with a payoff in GC φ u (U(t)) that is greater than its payoff in any coalition φ u (S s ). Hence, this player has an incentive to deviate from the GC.
Since we consider partially connected D2D networks, players would most likely form coalitions with their neighbors based on their preferences, which results in forming small coalitions' sizes, not large coalitions' sizes. In other words, the GC of all the players is seldom formed.
Therefore, the cost due to small coalition formations would not have a significant impact on the payoff functions. Subsequently, the proposed (U, φ) game is classified as a coalition formation game (CFG) [27] , where players form several independent disjoint coalitions. Hence, classical solution concepts for coalition games, such as the core [26] , may not be applicable for our problem. In brief, the proposed coalition game (U, φ) is a CFG, where the objective is to offer an algorithm for forming coalitions.
B. Coalition Formation Concepts
This section recalls the fundamental concepts of coalition formation games that are used in the next section. CFG, a subclass of coalition games, has been a topic of high interest in game theory research [27] , [28] , [31] . The fundamental approach in coalition formation games is to allow players in the formation set to join or leave a coalition based on a well-defined and most suitable preference for NTU games, i.e., Pareto Order. Pareto Order is the basis of many existing coalition formation concepts, e.g., the merge-and-split algorithm [29] .
One can see from definition 5 that different coalition structures may lead to different system payoffs as each coalition structure Ψ has its unique payoff φ(Ψ). These differences in Ψ and their corresponding payoffs φ(Ψ) are usually ordered through a comparison relationship. In the coalition game literature, e.g., [29] , comparison relationships based on orders are divided into individual value orders and coalition value orders. Individual order implies that comparison is performed based on the players' payoffs. This is referred to as the Pareto Order. In particular, in such order, no player is willing to move to another coalition when at least one of the players in that coalition is worse off. In other words, the payoff of players would be worse off after the new player joins. This is known as selfish behavior. Coalition order implies that two coalition structures are compared based on the payoff of the coalitions in these coalition structures. This is known as a utilitarian order and is denoted by . In other words, the notation Ψ 2 Ψ 1 means
. Subsequently, the definition of the preference operator that considered in this paper is given as follows.
Definition 6. A preference operator is defined for comparing two coalition structures Ψ 1 = {S 1 , · · · , S k } and Ψ 2 = {R 1 , · · · , R m } that are partitions of the same set of players U. The notation Ψ 2 Ψ 1 denotes that players in U are preferred to be in Ψ 2 than Ψ 1 .
IV. PROPOSED FULLY DISTRIBUTED SOLUTION
This section derives the constraints of forming a coalition. These constraints represent the optimal players' associations, the transmitting player, and its optimal IDNC packet in a coalition.
By the given constraints, our aim is to propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm relying on merge-and-split rules [29] .
A. Coalition Formation Constraints
Let U s be the set of all associated players in coalition S s and N s the subset of U s that have non-empty Wants set. Let M s be the subset of packets that in the Has set of each player in U s , which defined as M s = u∈Us H u . Let S s denote the set of all neighbor coalitions to coalition S s . For a coalition S s , the transmitting device a * s is the one that can achieve the least expected increase in the completion time. According to the analysis available in [24] , [25] , a transmitting device a * s and its packet combination κ a * s can be obtained by solving the following problem a * s = arg max a∈As\Ls |C a ∩ N s | + max κa∈κ(As) u∈Ls∩τ (κa)
where A s is the set of players in coalition S s that are not in any coverage zone of all other players in S s and L s (t) is the set of critical players that can potentially increase the overall payoff of the coalition S s before the t-th transmission. This set characterizes the players based on their anticiapted completion times to give them priority to be targeted in the next transmission.
In other words, L s (t) contains players that would potentially increase the maximum anticipated completion time if they are not targeted in the next transmission. It can be define mathematically as
The set of targeted players in coalition S s when device a * s transmits the combination κ a * s is τ (κ a * s ) = u ∈ S s |κ a * s ∩ W u | = 1 and C a * s u = 1 .
With the aforementioned variable definitions, we can reformulate the completion time minimization problem in IDNC-based partially connected D2D network per coalition at each time instance as follows
Constraint (9b) says that the number of targeted players in each coalition must be more than one to ensure that at each transmission at least a player is benefiting. Constraint (9c) states that all targeted players should not experience any collision.
To find the optimal solution to the problem in (9), we need to search over all the sets of optimal player-coalition associations, their different erasure patterns, players' actions and their optimal IDNC packets in one coalition. As pointed out in [22] for centralized fog system, this is a challenging problem. Further, the solution to (9) must go through the players' decisions to join/leave a coalition at each stage of the game. To seek a desirable solution to (9) that is capable of achieving significant completion time reduction, we propose to use a distributed algorithm relying on merge-and-split rules.
B. A Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm
This section presents a distributed coalition forming algorithm to obtain the minimum completion time of players. The key mechanism is to allow players in coalition formation process to make individual decisions for selecting potential neighbor coalitions at any game stage. We first define two rules of merge-and-split that allow the modification of Ψ of the set U players as follows. 
where {S 1 , · · · , S k } and Ψ 2 are the new set of coalitions and the new coalition structure after the split operation, respectively.
The merge rule means that two coalitions merge if their merger would benefit not only the players in the merged coalition but also benefit the overall coalition structure value, i.e., the overall completion time. On the other hand, a coalition split into smaller ones if its splitter coalitions enhance at least the payoff of one player in that coalition. Therefore, using these two known rules, we present a distributed algorithm to solve the completion time minimization problem in (3) . The proposed algorithm is broken into three steps as follows.
First, in Ψ ini , players need to discover their neighbors by utilizing one of different known neighbor discovery schemes, e.g., those used in wireless networks [34] . For example, each player broadcasts a message consisting of two segments; each segment consists of one byte.
While the first byte indicates the number of players in each player's coverage zone, the second byte indicates the completion time of that player. Further, players collect all aforementioned information, and the one who is connected to a large number of players, has a large Has set, and not in the coverage zone of any player in any other coalitions. However, if such player does not exist, the size of the coalition is increased until that player exists. To summarize, a transmitting player a * s in coalition s should satisfy (9b) and (9c) and can be obtained by solving problem (6) . Afterward, each player evaluates its potential payoff as in (5) to make an accurate decision as explained in step II. The selected transmitting player in each coalition is referred to a coalition head who can do the analysis in step II. Therefore, this step significantly reduces the search space of the coalition formation.
The coalition formation step optimizes the selection of the transmitting players and their IDNC packets through many successive split-and-merge rules between coalitions. Therefore, step II is to assign players to potential neighbor coalitions, select the transmitting player, and find its optimal IDNC packet, which can be accomplished by the following. In this step, the time-index is updated to τ = τ + 1. The merge rules are implemented by checking the merging possibilities of each pair of neighbor coalitions s and k. Particularly, a coalition s ∈ Ψ τ can decide to merge with another coalition k to form a new coalition j. As such, the resulting structure guarantees both merge conditions (MC).
• MC1: There exists at least one player satisfies (9b) and (9c). Position in y (m) Fig. 2 . A resulting coalition structure Ψfin = {S1, S2} from Algorithm 1 for a partially connected D2D network that is presented in Fig. 1 .
performed on the players that do not benefit from being a member of that coalition. In other terms, coalition s ∈ Ψ τ can be splitted into coalitions of smaller sizes as long as the splitter coalitions guarantee both split conditions (SC).
• SC1: At least one player can strictly enhance its payoff without increasing the payoffs of all the remaining players.
• SC2: In each split coalition, there exists at least one player satisfying (9b) and (9c).
At the end of the split rules, the coalition structure Ψ 1 is updated. The time index is updated along with a sequence of merge-and-split rules which take place in a distributed manner. Such sequence continues based on the resulting payoff of each player and coalition. It ends when there is no further merge-and-split rules required in the current coalition structure Ψ τ , which is the case of the final coalition structure Ψ fin .
Finally, each transmitting player in each coalition broadcasts an IDNC packet to all players in its coverage zone. The distributed merge-and-split coalition formation algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. We repeat the above three steps until all packets are disseminated among players, as explained in Algorithm 2. Players are organized themselves into an initial coalition structure Ψ ini = {S 1 , · · · , S k }; Initialize time-index τ = 0 and Ψ τ = Ψ ini ;
Step I: Coalition Members Discovery;
• Each player discovers its neighboring players. for each S s ∈ Ψ ini , ∀s = {1, 2, · · · , k} do Select the transmitting players A s that satisfying (9b) and (9c) and find a * s and its IDNC packet κ a * s by solving (6) . Calculate the utility of each player as in (5) . end for
Step II: Coalition Formation;
• The optimization target in coalition S s is min
• Obtain player's assignments based on the two main rules of merge and split:
repeat
The selected transmitting player analyzes all possible merge rules. If a merge occurs, the current coalition structure Ψ τ −1 is updated. Update A s and update the selected transmitting player by solving (6) .
The selected transmitting player analyzes all possible split rules. If a split occurs, the current coalition structure Ψ τ is updated. Update A s and update the selected transmitting player by solving (6) . end for until No further merge nor split rules Output The convergence coalition structure Ψ fin = Ψ τ .
Step III: IDNC Packet Transmission;
• Each transmitting player a * s in each coalition broadcasts IDNC packet κ a * s to all players in its coverage zone. in a red circle; their targeted players and the optimal IDNC packets are shown in Fig. 2 . In a nutshell, we shed some remarks on executing Algorithm 1. disseminate all packets to all players. This is because each formed coalition has only some portion of packets and does not have the wanted packets of other players in other coalitions.
For packet recovery completion, each coalition is formed, at each transmission round, based on the individual preference of its members and irrespective of the Has sets of its members.
Thus, each transmitting player has disseminated some packets to each visited coalition in previous transmissions.
In the considered game, each player has two actions to take either to transmit an IDNC packet κ or to listen to a transmission. Therefore, the action of a player u at each game stage t is AC u (t) = {transmit κ u , remain silent}. The asymmetry of the side information at each player generates a different packet combination to be sent by each player at each transmission round. This causes the asymmetry of the action space of each player. Also, in each transmission, different players are associated with each coalition. All these make the payoff of each coalition unique.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS, COMPLEXITY, AND COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
This section first studies the convergence of the coalition formation algorithm and its Nash equilibrium stability. Afterward, the complexity properties of Algorithm 1 is analyzed, which shows that Algorithm 1 needs a low signaling overhead.
A. Convergence and Nash Equilibrium
In coalition formation games, the stability of the coalition structures corresponds to an equilibrium state known as Nash-equilibrium. This subsection proves that the convergence of the coalition formation algorithm is guaranteed and it is a Nash-stable coalition structure.
The following theorem demonstrates that Algorithm 1 terminates in a finite number of iterations.
Theorem 1. Given any initial coalition structure Ψ ini , the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1 maps to a sequence of merge-and-split rules which converges, in a finite number of iterations, to a final coalition structure Ψ fin composed of a number of disjoint coalitions.
Proof. To proof this theorem, we need to show that for any merge or split rule, there exists a new coalition structure which results from the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1. Starting from any initial coalition structure Ψ ini , the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1 can be mapped to a sequence of merge/split rules. As per definition 8 and definition 9, every merge or split rule transforms the current coalition structure into another coalition structure, hence we obtain the following sequence of coalition structures
where Ψ i+1 Ψ i , and → indicates the occurrence of a merge-and-split rule. Since the Pareto Order introduced in definition 6 is irreflexive, transitive and monotonic, a coalition structure cannot be revisited. Given the fact that the number of merge and split rules of a finite set is finite and the merge/split operations-coalition structure mapping, the number of coalition structure sequences in (10) is finite. Therefore, the sequence in (10) always terminates and converge to a final coalition structure Ψ fin .
Definition 9. A coalition structure Ψ = {S 1 , · · · , S k } is Nash-stable if players have no incentive to leave Ψ through merge-and-split operations.
This definition implies that any coalition structure Ψ is considered as a Nash-stable coalition structure if and only if no player has an incentive to move from its current coalition and join another coalition or make an individual decision by performing any merge/split rules. Further, the coalitions in the final coalition structure Ψ fin have no incentive to do more merge and split operations. A Nash-stable coalition structure is also an individually stable coalition structure.
In general, in a coalition formation game, Nash-stability is a subset of individual stability [33] .
Specifically, no player leaves its current coalition through a split rule and form an empty coalition, i.e., no singleton coalition is formed if the following property holds.
Property 2.
There exists at least one coalition structure Ψ that satisfies both Nash-stability and individual stability if and only if ∀S s ∈ Ψ such that |S s | > 1.
Proof: This property states that forming a singleton coalition cannot happen. Indeed, since each player cannot send an encoded packet to itself, it believes that a better payoff can be obtained by being a member of any coalition. Further, since the payoff of a non-targeted player in any coalition and a single player-coalition is the same, our proposed algorithm, as mentioned in the previous section, avoids making any merge-and-split rules for equal payoff values. Thus, according to Algorithm 1, a Nash-stable and individual stable coalition structure can be obtained.
As a consequence of Property 2, the final coalition structure Ψ fin that results from Algorithm 1 is D hp stable as the coalitions have no incentive to do further merge-and-split operations. D hp stable is also known as merge-and-split proof [33] . Furthermore, Ψ fin can be considered as D c stable. This is because players have no incentive to leave Ψ fin and form any other coalitions [29] .
To illustrate the above concepts, consider the resulting coalition structure Ψ fin = {S 1 , S 2 } that shown in Fig. 2 . The coalition structure Ψ fin is Nash-stable as no player has an incentive to leave its current coalition. For example, player u 5 has a payoff of φ 5 = 2, and, by (5) its payoff is −2. If player u 5 switches to act non-cooperatively and joins S 1 , player u 6 would be the new transmitting player in S 1 . In this case, player u 5 will be in the coverage zone of both transmitting players u 1 in S 2 and u 6 in S 1 . Consequently, the payoff of player u 5 decreases to φ 5 (S 1 ) = −3, and the payoff of player u 6 decreases from φ 6 (S 1 ) = −3 to φ 6 (S 1 ) = −4.
Thus, player u 5 does not deviate form its current coalition S 2 and join S 1 . Similarly, if players u 2 and u 3 act non-cooperatively by leaving S 2 and forming a singleton coalition for each, i.e., can be performed by the coalitions and no player has incentive to deviate from Ψ fin , respectively.
B. Complexity Analysis and Communication Overhead
This section analyzes the computational complexity and communication burden of Algorithm 1.
Computational Complexity: Each player at any game stage needs to find the optimal IDNC packet combination, which depends on the packets that it possesses. Further, since a game with incomplete information, i.e., each player knows only the side information of players in its coverage zone, every player can generate the IDNC packet combinations of all other players in its coverage zone. This allows every player to calculate the payoff function (5) Communication Overhead: The communication overhead of Algorithm 1 is related to perform the members' discovery step, coalition heads selection, and the analysis of merge-and-split rules, which is associated with the total number of coalition formations.
First, similar to many algorithms in the literature, e.g., [34] , the member discovery step needs |N | 2-byte messages, in which each message is being sent to all neighbor players which is denoted by U. Thus, the total communication overhead for discovering the neighbor players is |2N U| bytes.
Second, coalition head selection can be performed in many different strategies, e.g., based on players' attributes [35] , [36] . In Algorithm 1, players in each coalition initially select their coalition head by exchanging an advertisement message among them, and the one that satisfies the conditions C1 and C2 in Section IV-B would be chosen. The same process is applied for selecting/updating the coalition head in step III. Being a player connected to most players in the coalition, the coalition head is responsible for ensuring that the rest of the coalition's members received an acknowledgment (ACK). As such, they can update their side information after each D2D transmission.
Third, the communication overhead of the coalition formation step is based on the number of merge-and-split rules, which is mainly related to the total number of decisions made by each of the N players. As previously mentioned, the merge-and-split operations enumerate only the neighbor coalitions S s . Thus, two extreme cases can occur.
• If all coalitions' players decide to leave their current coalitions and join other coalitions.
In this case, each player u in coalition S s would make |S s | decisions (player u has an |S s | possibilities to join any of the neighbor coalitions). Consequently, the total number of players' decisions is Q worst = N |S s |, and the overhead complexity is of the order O(N |S s |).
• If players did not make any decisions. Since no decision is made by players, the overhead in this case is only Q best = N (due to the initial player-coalition associations as in step I),
and a complexity order of O(N ).
In practical, the number of players' decisions is between the above two cases, i.e., Q best ≤ Q ≤ Q worst . Hence, if L average decisions are made by players, then Q = N |L| decisions that perform split-and-merge rules are needed until Algorithm 1 converges.
Therefore, combining all the signaling overhead components, the total overhead is N (2U + |L|). Such signaling overhead will add only a few bytes, which are negligible in size compared to the entire packet's size. Furthermore, to update the Has and Wants sets of players, only the indices of packets needed for the communication between the players, not their contents. Hence, we ignore signaling overhead factor because it is first constant (independent on the completion time and decoding delay) and that its size is negligible.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed coalition formation game (denoted by CFG partially-connected D2D) to demonstrate its capability of reducing the completion time compare to the baseline schemes. We first introduce the simulation setup and the comparison schemes. Then, the completion time and game performances are investigated, respectively.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider an IDNC-enabled partially connected D2D network where players are uniformly re-positioned for each iteration in a 500m×500m cell with connectivity index C, which is defined as the ratio of the average number of neighbors to the total number of players N .
A simple partially connected D2D network setting is plotted in Fig. 3 for the presented example in Fig. 1 . The system setting in this paper follows the setup studied in [21] , [22] . The initial side information H u and W u , ∀u ∈ U of players is independently drawn based on their average erasure probability. The short-range communications are more reliable than the BSplayer communications [19] , [20] . Hence, unless specified, we assume that the player-to-player erasure probability σ is half the BS-to-player erasure in all simulations, i.e., σ = 0.5 . Our simulations were implemented using Matlab on a Windows 10 laptop 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM. For the sake of comparison, we implement the following schemes.
• The fully-connected D2D system in which a single user who has the largest number of received packets transmits an IDNC packet at each round.
• The PMP system in which the BS is responsible for the transmissions. The BS holds all the requested packets and can serve all the users. This scheme was proposed in [12] .
• The one coalition formation game in a partially connected D2D (denoted by OCF partiallyconnected D2D). In this scheme, only one coalition is formed, and a single player transmits an IDNC packet at each round. The transmitting player is selected based on its number of received packets as well as on the maximum number of players in its coverage zone.
• The partially D2D in FRANs (denoted by FRAN partially-connected D2D). In this scheme, a fog central unit is responsible for determining the set of transmitting users and the packet combinations. This scheme was proposed in [22] .
B. Completion Time Performance Evaluation
To study the completion time performance of the proposed solution, we change the number of players, packets, connectivity index, and the packet erasure probability.
In Fig. 4 , we depict the average completion time as a function of the number of players We observe from Fig. 4 that, for a small number of players, the PMP system is close to both the CFG partially-connected D2D and FRAN partially-connected D2D schemes. This is because, for a small number of players (N ≤ 60), the certainty that the whole frame M is distributed between players in the initial transmissions is low, thus decreasing the probability of exchanging potential IDNC packets between players. This makes the overall completion time performance of the partial D2D scenarios close to the PMP scheme. As the number of players increases (N ≥ 80), the bigger the certainty that the union of their Has sets is equal to M . This results in more potential D2D IDNC packet exchange, thus increasing the gap between the PMP is noticeable compared to the fully-connected D2D and OCF partially-connected D2D schemes, as shown in Fig. 6 . We clearly see that the completion time of the partial D2D schemes is better than the PMP one because of their multiple players' transmissions at each round. Moreover, as the player-to-player erasure probability increases, the BS-player erasure probability increases two-fold ( = 2σ), thus slightly affecting the performance of the PMP scheme. The partial D2D settings, however, benefit from short range and reliable communications which provide much better players reachability and IDNC packet successful delivery compared to the PMP setting.
In Fig. 7 , we investigate the average completion time as a function of the connectivity index C for a network composed of N = 60, M = 30, = 0.25, and σ = 0.12. It can clearly be seen that for a low connectivity index (C ≤ 0.4), the proposed CFG partially-connected D2D approach noticeably outperforms the fully-connected D2D and OCF partially-connected D2D approaches.
In such poorly connected networks (C ≤ 0.4), multiple simultaneous players' transmissions are exploited in partially D2D algorithms. However, as the connectivity index increases (C ≥ 0.6), the number of formed disjoint coalitions in our proposed solution is drastically reduced, thus reducing the number of transmitting players. This results in a performance agreement with the fully-connected D2D scheme. Being independent of the coverage zones of the transmitting players and the delay created by those players, the PMP scheme is not affected by the changes to C. Thus, the PMP scheme has constant average completion time.
To conclude this section, we study the influence of the setting σ = 0.5 on the completion time performance of our proposed scheme. In Table I, we summarize the completion time perfromance for different values of σ. The considered network setup has 30 players, 20 packets, = 0.5, and C = 0.1. From Table I , we note that the completion time of our proposed solution still outperforms the PMP scheme for σ = 0.7 and approximately reaches the same performance as for the PMP scheme for σ = 0.9 . This is due to the simultaneous transmissions and cooperative decisions by the transmitting players, which show the potential of the proposed CFG solution in minimizing the completion time of users.
C. Proposed CFG Perfromance Evaluation
To quantify the analysis of the proposed formation coalition solution, we plot in Fig. 8 the average number of coalitions as a function of the number of players N for a network composed of M = 30, a different connectivity index (C = 0.6, C = 0.3, and C = 0.1), and σ = 0.12. Fig. 8 shows that the average coalition size increases with the increase in the number of players. This is because, as N increases, the number of cooperating players increases, thus increasing the average size of the formed coalitions. We can conclude from Fig. 8 that the resulting coalition structure Ψ fin from Algorithm 1 is composed of a small number of relatively large coalitions 
Network Setup
Number of Coalitions Split-and-merge rules Setup 1: N = 100 and C = 0.1 16. 34 8.12 Setup 2: N = 160 and C = 0.1 23.67 12.76 when C = 0.6. When C = 0.1, this number of formed coalitions increase and the resulting coalition structure Ψ fin is composed of a large number of small coalitions' sizes.
In Table II , we evaluate the complexity of the proposed coalition game solution as a function of the algorithmic running time. In particular, Table II lists Although the completion time achieved by the CFG partially-connected D2D scheme is roughly the same as the centralized FRAN partially-connected D2D, the computing time required by our developed scheme is slightly higher than that required by the FRAN partially-connected D2D. This is because our proposed scheme needs time to converge before generating the output. The centralized FRAN scheme has low execution time due to the presence of the fog entity.
Finally, to evaluate the convergence rate analysis of the proposed scheme, the average number of merge-and-split rules before Algorithm 1 converges to the final coalition structure is listed in Table III . To achieve the stable coalition with our proposed CFG scheme, network setup 1 requires on average 16 iterations, and network setup 2 needs on average 22 iterations. These results show that our proposed distributed algorithm is robust to different network setups. In summary, these results show that our proposed algorithm allows D2D users to form stable coalitions with a good convergence speed, which further confirm the theoretical findings in Theorem 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a distributed game-theoretical framework for a partially connected D2D network using coalition game and IDNC optimization. As such, the completion time of users is minimized. In particular, our proposed model is formulated as a coalition formation game with nontransferable utility, and a fully distributed coalition formation algorithm is proposed. The proposed distributed algorithm is converged to a Nash-stable coalition structure using split-andmerge rules while accounting for the altruistic players' preferences. With such a distributed solution, each player has to maintain a partial feedback matrix only for the players in its coverage zone instead of the global feedback matrix required in the fully connected D2D networks. A comprehensive completion time and game performances evaluation have been carried out for the proposed distributed coalition game. In particular, our performance evaluation results comprehensively demonstrated that our proposed distributed solution offers almost same completion time performance similar to centralized FRAN D2D network.
